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COMMENT
Letting One Fly over the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Automatic
Reversal Is the Only Effective Remedy for Denial of
Counsel at a Mental Competency Hearing
I. Introduction
“I am crazier than anything you’ve ever seen.” 1 This was Edward
Robinson’s announcement to a California court immediately before he was
permitted to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se.2 Robinson had
previously been examined by a psychiatrist who concluded his selfdiagnoses of Bipolar 2 and ADHD were “probably accurate.”3
Notwithstanding further evidence of alcohol dependency and a “core layer
of an anti-social character structure,” he was declared competent to stand
trial and to waive his right to an attorney. 4 Later on in the proceedings,
competency again became an issue when Robinson himself suggested he
was mentally unstable, and he requested the court provide another
psychiatric evaluation.5 Despite the court’s concerns, Robinson was
allowed to represent himself at a subsequent competency hearing where he
was again deemed fit to stand trial and to continue pro se. 6 For the next two
months, Robinson continued his self-representation until, finally, the court
convinced him to allow court-appointed counsel to represent him through
the remainder of the trial.7
The Sixth Amendment, incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 8 provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.” 9 The United States Supreme Court has deemed the right to
counsel fundamental, explaining that of all a defendant’s rights, the right to

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

People v. Robinson, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102, 105 (Ct. App. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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representation “is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert
any other rights he may have.” 10
This fundamental right attaches to all critical stages of criminal
prosecution. 11 Such “critical stages” include preliminary hearings,
arraignments, and postindictment interrogations. 12 Counsel is required
because these are “proceedings that hold significant consequences for the
accused.” 13 Without an attorney’s assistance, a defendant may be
substantially prejudiced by the outcome of these proceedings.14 Mental
competency hearings—proceedings in which courts assess a defendant’s
ability to rationally consult with his lawyer and understand the trial
process 15—also have these characteristics.16 And although the Supreme
Court has not yet decided whether a competency hearing is a critical stage,
every circuit court to confront the issue has held it is. 17
Once a defendant’s right to counsel has attached, that right can be either
actually or constructively denied. 18 Actual denial of counsel most
commonly occurs when an incompetent defendant is allowed to proceed pro
se, effectively denying his right to counsel, as occurred in the California
case, People v. Robinson. 19 Because the Sixth Amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant’s right to an attorney, as well as the right to proceed pro
se, 20 issues of autonomy arise when a court attempts to force counsel upon
a defendant. 21 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held courts may require
a higher level of competency for self-representation. 22 Therefore, even
though a defendant may be competent to stand trial, a court may find he
10. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
11. United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005).
12. Right to Counsel, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 517, 518 (2012).
13. Collins, 430 F.3d at 1264 (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 (2002)).
14. Id. (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)).
15. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
16. See Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Being There: Constructive Denial of Counsel at a
Competency Hearing as Structural Error Under the Sixth Amendment, 56 S.D. L. REV. 238,
241-42 (2011).
17. Raymond v. Weber, 552 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2009); Collins, 430 F.3d at 1264;
Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1262
(D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554, 1556 (4th Cir. 1992); Sturgis v.
Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986)).
18. See Parsons, supra note 16, at 241.
19. People v. Robinson, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102, 105 (Ct. App. 2007).
20. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
21. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176-77 (2008).
22. Id. at 178.
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does not have the mental capacity to waive counsel and conduct his own
defense. 23 Some lower courts have gone so far as to insist “it is
‘contradictory to conclude that a defendant whose competency is
reasonably in question could nevertheless knowingly and intelligently
waive her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.’” 24 Thus, when a potentially
incompetent defendant is permitted to proceed pro se, this amounts to an
actual denial of counsel.25
A defendant’s right to counsel can also be constructively denied.
Constructive denial of counsel is judged against the standard announced by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Cronic: “The right to the effective
assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the
prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing.” 26 This standard is invoked when “counsel has entirely failed to
function as the client's advocate.” 27
Circuits are split regarding the proper remedy for denial of counsel at a
mental competency hearing. Disagreement primarily centers on whether
this Sixth Amendment violation contaminates the remainder of the trial.28
The Third and Sixth Circuits hold that deprivation of counsel warrants
automatic reversal of any conviction.29 By contrast, the D.C. and Tenth
Circuits employ retrospective hearings to decide if the absence of counsel
impacted the outcome of the trials; however, the purpose of each circuit’s
retrospective hearing is different.30 The D.C. Circuit seeks to determine if
counsel’s assistance could have changed the outcome of the competency
23. Id. at 176-78.
24. United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 870 (6th Cir. 2012), reh'g denied (Apr. 16,
2013) (quoting United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
25. E.g., Klat, 156 F.3d at 1260; People v. Lightsey, 279 P.3d 1072, 1091-92 (Cal.
2012); People v. Robinson, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102, 105 (Ct. App. 2007).
26. 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (emphasis added).
27. Parsons, supra note 16, at 240.
28. Compare United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating
that the Sixth Amendment violation only contaminates the entire proceeding “if the
defendant stands trial while incompetent”), and Klat, 156 F.3d at 1264 (holding that if
counsel could not have changed the competency hearing result, reversal was not required
because the error did not contaminate the entire proceeding), with Ross, 703 F.3d at 874
(holding that automatic reversal is required without any requirement that the defendant show
prejudice; the constitutional violation was complete upon deprivation of counsel at the
competency hearing), and Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing prior
circuit case law noting that deprivation of counsel at a competency hearing contaminated the
whole proceeding).
29. Ross, 703 F.3d at 874; Appel, 250 F.3d at 218.
30. Bergman, 599 F.3d at 1148-49; Klat, 156 F.3d at 1264.
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hearing. 31 On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit asks if the violation resulted
in an erroneous competency determination by retrospectively examining the
defendant’s competency. 32
This Comment will address the current circuit split and argue that the
Third and Sixth Circuits’ rule of automatic reversal is the only remedy that
fully protects a defendant’s fundamental Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Part II presents necessary background information regarding competency
procedures, examines Supreme Court decisions shedding light on this area,
and outlines the federal statute governing competency proceedings. Part III
explores the current circuit split. Finally, Part IV analyzes the merits and
flaws of each approach and advocates for the adoption of the Third and
Sixth Circuits’ rule of automatic reversal.
II.Substantive and Procedural Safeguards: Protecting a Defendant’s Right
Not to Stand Trial While Incompetent
A defendant’s right to not stand trial while mentally incompetent is
deeply entrenched in history with roots dating back at least to the eighteenth
century. 33 The origin of this right has been attributed to the prohibition of
trials in absentia: “The mentally incompetent defendant, though physically
present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend
himself.” 34 Blackstone wrote that a court could not try a defendant who
became “mad” after pleading “for how can he make his defense?” 35 This
common-law understanding made its way into modern American law, and
the United States Supreme Court has deemed the right not to stand trial
while incompetent fundamental. 36 Established procedures and a guiding
substantive standard now protect defendants. 37 Inadequate efforts to
safeguard this fundamental right deprive defendants of their right to a fair
trial 38 and undercut the integrity of the verdict. 39
31. Klat, 156 F.3d at 1264.
32. Bergman, 599 F.3d at 1148-49.
33. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
34. Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U.
PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960).
35. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24.
36. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72.
37. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
38. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.
39. Steven R. Marino, Comment, Are You Sufficiently Competent to Prove Your
Incompetence? An Analysis of the Paradox in the Federal Courts, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REV. 165, 167 (2009).
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A. Mental Competency Procedures: How Courts Determine a Defendant’s
Competency
Competency proceedings are widely employed in the United States.
Approximately sixty thousand evaluations are ordered each year with
roughly 20% leading to findings of incompetence.40 The primary purpose of
these hearings is to ensure defendants are not tried while incompetent.41
The Supreme Court has held it unconstitutional to try, convict, or sentence
an incompetent defendant, and adequate procedures must exist to ensure
this does not occur. 42 A court’s failure to provide sufficient procedures to
safeguard a criminal defendant's right to not stand trial while incompetent
“deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.”43
Competency proceedings are initiated in several ways. The prosecutor or
defense attorney may raise the issue by filing a motion for a hearing any
time after the commencement of prosecution and prior to sentencing. 44
Alternatively, the trial court may order a hearing sua sponte. 45 Regardless
of the procedure employed, however, once the judge has “‘reasonable cause
to believe’ that the defendant ‘may presently be’ incompetent,” the court
must conduct a hearing. 46
Prior to the defendant’s competency hearing, a licensed or certified
psychiatrist or psychologist may conduct a psychological examination.47 A
variety of tests “ranging from informal checklists to structured, criterionbased scoring instruments” may be utilized to measure the defendant’s
competency. 48 In making his assessment, the evaluator considers factors
including mental disability, behavior and mood, disorientation, memory
impairment, hallucination or delusion, and impaired thought process.49 The
evaluator then submits a report to the court outlining his conclusions
40. Introduction, MENTAL COMPETENCY: BEST PRACTICES MODEL, http://www.mental
competency.org/index.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
41. See Marino, supra note 39, at 166.
42. See David W. Beaudreau, Comment, Due Process or "Some Process"? Restoring
Pate v. Robinson's Guarantee of Adequate Competency Procedures, 47 CAL. W. L. REV.
369, 370-71 (2011) (discussing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)).
43. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 385).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012).
45. Id.
46. 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 208 (4th ed. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)).
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(b), 4247(b).
48. Gianni Pirelli et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Competency to Stand Trial
Research, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1, 3 (2011).
49. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 171, 186 (1984).
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regarding the defendant’s competency, along with information about the
defendant’s mental history, symptoms, and psychological test results.50 The
psychological report is not controlling on the court, but it is unlikely to be
arbitrarily rejected. 51
Although defendants do not typically have the right to have counsel
present at the evaluation, 52 they do have the right to consult with their
attorney about submitting to the examination and about consequences that
may result from statements made to the examiner. 53 While it appears courts
will initially protect statements regarding guilt from being admitted into
evidence, it is possible they may be admissible for impeachment or
rebuttal. 54 Moreover, even if the evidence is improperly admitted, it will
only be subject to review for harmless error, and this deferential standard is
unlikely to result in an overturned conviction.55
A defendant at a competency hearing is entitled to the full range of
procedural safeguards including the right to notice, to call witnesses, crossexamine opposing witnesses, present evidence, and to seek the counsel of
an attorney. 56 Defendants are presumed competent at the outset of trial;
however, there is a split in authorities concerning which party bears the
burden of proof. 57 Without statutory guidance or a binding Supreme Court
decision on point, the circuits disagree about whether the defendant must
prove his own incompetence or whether the government must prove the
defendant is competent to stand trial. 58
The judge makes the competency determination based on whether, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the defendant “has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual

50. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c).
51. WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 46, at § 208.
52. United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
53. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470-71 (1981); see also WRIGHT & LEIPOLD,
supra note 46, at § 208.
54. WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 46, at § 208.
55. See id.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) (2012).
57. WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 46, at § 208; see also Brett F. Kinney, Comment, An
Incompetent Jurisprudence: The Burden of Proof in Competency Hearings, 43 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 683, 685 (2009) (noting the current split between the Third, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits, which place the burden of proof upon the government, and the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits, which place the burden upon the defendant); Marino, supra note 39, at 165.
58. Marino, supra note 39, at 178-79; see 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
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understanding of the proceedings against him.” 59 Competence is ultimately
a question of law decided on the basis of expert testimony from the
psychological report as well as other evidentiary materials presented,
possibly including lay witness testimony. 60 The competency determination
ultimately hinges on the defendant’s ability to understand (1) the charges
against him, (2) the role of the parties and court, (3) that he is being tried in
a court of law, and (4) that he may face punishment if convicted. 61
If the court finds the defendant competent, the trial moves forward. Upon
a finding of incompetence, however, the proceedings are stayed and the
defendant is remanded to the Attorney General’s custody. 62 The defendant
is then hospitalized in a suitable facility for treatment for up to four months
while a decision is made about whether or not he is likely to become
competent. 63 This four-month period may be extended if the court finds it
substantially probable that he may become competent within a reasonable
period of time. 64 If the facility’s director determines during the hospital stay
that the defendant has recovered, he will notify the court.65 There will then
be another competency hearing. 66 If the defendant is found competent, the
court will order the defendant discharged from the facility and the case
placed back on the court’s docket. 67 However, if after four months there is
no likelihood the defendant will attain competence in the foreseeable future,

59. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Twenty-four years after the
Supreme Court’s articulation of its two-prong standard in Dusky, Congress promulgated its
standard for incompetency. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 2057 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012)). Upon finding “reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense[,]” the court must grant a motion to determine the competency of a defendant, or
order such a motion via sua sponte. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). The statute incorporated ideas from
the Supreme Court standard, but also added the requirement of a mental disease or defect.
Emily Stork, Note, A Competent Competency Standard: Should It Require a Mental Disease
or Defect? A Debate Sparked by the Circuit Split over Axis II Personality Disorders and
Competency to Stand Trial, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 927, 936-37 (2013) (asserting that
the Supreme Court’s Dusky standard remains the principal federal competency test).
60. Proof of Facts, supra note 49, at 186-87.
61. Id. at 189.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A).
65. Id. § 4241(e).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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the defendant becomes subject to further civil commitment procedures by
the State. 68
B. Supreme Court Precedent: Evolution of the Right to Counsel at a
Competency Hearing and Remedies for Deprivation of Counsel
It is well settled that the right to counsel attaches to critical stages of
prosecution, 69 which are those presenting significant consequences for a
defendant. 70 But, although the Supreme Court has determined a trial is
unfair if a defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage, 71 it has never
specifically addressed whether a competency hearing qualifies as one. 72 Of
course, this may be because those circuit courts that have confronted the
issue have unanimously agreed it does. 73
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether a competency
hearing is a critical stage, it has recognized the importance of counsel at
competency proceedings since the early 1980s.74 In Estelle v. Smith, the
Court held that a defendant charged with a capital crime had a Sixth
Amendment right to consult with counsel before submitting to a psychiatric
examination. 75 The district court had ordered Smith to undergo a
psychiatric examination to determine his competency to stand trial, and he
was subsequently examined without an opportunity to consult with his
attorney. 76 The Supreme Court recognized that Smith’s psychiatric
interview was a critical stage because information obtained in the
examination concerning Smith’s criminal propensities was later introduced

68. Id. §§ 4241(d), 4246, 4248.
69. E.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
70. E.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 (2002).
71. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
72. Parsons, supra note 16, at 242.
73. Raymond v. Weber, 552 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Collins, 430
F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d
1554, 1556 (4th Cir. 1992); Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
75. Id. at 469.
76. Id. at 456-57, 471. The district judge ordered the psychiatric examination despite the
lack of any signs of incompetence or any request for a hearing by either party. Id. at 457 n.1.
The judge explained that he routinely ordered psychiatric examinations for every defendant
facing capital charges to ensure there was no doubt about the competency of a defendant
who was put to death. Id.
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at sentencing to secure the death penalty. 77 Smith’s right to consult with
counsel in this case was “‘literally a life or death matter.’”78
Seven years later in Satterwhite v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered
the remedy for the introduction of psychiatric testimony obtained in an
Estelle-like examination where the defendant had no prior opportunity to
consult with counsel. 79 The Court determined there was a Sixth
Amendment violation but noted, “[n]ot all constitutional violations amount
to reversible error.” 80 A verdict may stand if the government can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error did not affect the
verdict. 81 This “harmless error rule ‘promotes public respect for the
criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather
than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.’”82 But
pervasive Sixth Amendment violations—those that contaminate the entire
trial—merit remedial measures.83 Rejecting Satterwhite’s request for
automatic reversal, the Court decided the harmless error rule applied in this
case because the violation was limited to admission of psychiatric
testimony. 84 The court reasoned that testimony from the uncounseled
psychiatric examination did not affect or contaminate the entire proceeding
in order to merit automatic reversal of conviction.85
Harmless error analysis was appropriate—instead of automatic
reversal—because the error’s scope was readily identifiable.86 On remand,
the trial court could make a meaningful inquiry into whether the violation
impacted the jury’s deliberations and ultimately affected the trial’s
outcome. 87 The Court distinguished this from past cases meriting automatic
reversal because in those, the trial court could only speculate about the
violation’s impact as the error pervaded the entire proceeding. 88
The Supreme Court provided the framework for a rule of automatic
reversal in its 1984 case United States v. Cronic. 89 Cronic argued he was
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 458-59, 470-71.
Id. at 471 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (1979)).
486 U.S. 249, 254 (1988).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256, 258 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Id. at 256 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256-57 (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978)).
Id.
466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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denied counsel because his attorney was given only twenty-five days to
prepare for his $9.4 million check fraud trial even though the prosecution
had investigated and prepared for over four years. 90 The Court did not
determine Chronic was denied effective assistance of counsel but, instead,
reversed and remanded the case for further review. 91 It stated, however,
that the circumstances surrounding the case could support the unlikelihood
for effective assistance.92
The Court noted that technical appointment of counsel was not enough to
satisfy the constitutional guarantee, and holding otherwise would “convert
the appointment of counsel into a sham.” 93 Expounding on the fundamental
importance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court explained
that an attorney is crucial to ensuring all of a criminal defendant’s rights are
protected. 94 When a defendant is completely denied counsel, denied counsel
at a critical stage of trial, or constructively denied counsel, these situations
“are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect
in a particular case is unjustified.” 95 Under these circumstances, the
defendant is not required to make any showing of prejudice because “the
adversary process itself [is] presumptively unreliable.” 96
Finally, in 2008, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Indiana
v. Edwards. 97 Wrestling with limitations on the right to self-representation,
the Court held lower courts may insist a defendant be represented by
counsel based on their mental inability to provide self-representation, even
though they may be competent to stand trial.98 The Court reasoned that
granting mentally incompetent defendants these rights could lead to
erroneous convictions and improper sentences. 99 Allowing an incompetent
defendant’s right of self-representation would not further any sense of
dignity or autonomy, “but rather would compromise the ultimate objective
of providing a fair trial, as well as the concurrent aspiration that
‘proceedings must not only be fair, they must appear fair to all who observe
them.’” 100 Indiana v. Edwards thus created two tiers of competency
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 649.
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 666.
Id. (citing Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940)).
Id. at 653.
Id. at 658-60.
Id. at 659.
554 U.S. 164 (2008).
Id. at 174, 177-78.
Id. at 176-77.
Parsons, supra note 16, at 243 (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177).
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whereby it is permissible for a court to find a defendant competent to stand
trial but not competent to waive counsel and provide his own
representation. 101
Based on the Supreme Court’s demonstrated concern for a defendant’s
right to counsel during competency proceedings, it is likely the Court would
join the federal circuits in holding that a competency hearing is a critical
stage of trial. But until the Court takes up the issue and answers the
remedial question the lower courts are likely to remain divided on the
proper remedy.
C. The Federal Statutes: Codified Procedural Safeguards for Defendants in
Competency Hearings
Congress has also expressed concern for incompetent defendants by
creating a statutory scheme full of protective procedures. Found at 18
U.S.C. §§ 4241-4248, these statutes describe the proper processes for courts
to follow when dealing with potentially incompetent defendants. This
subsection will examine the origins of the statutes and outline their
requirements.
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA) 102 modernized
federal criminal law and has been referred to as “the most radical change in
federal criminal law in the history of our Nation.” 103 As part of the CCCA,
Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA) 104 in response to
public outrage over John Hinkley’s not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict
for his assassination attempt on President Reagan. 105 The outcry stirred
Congress to modify the legal procedures for determining insanity and
incompetency. 106 The IDRA updated the process for determining a
defendant’s competency to stand trial in order to comply with Supreme
Court standards. 107
With this federal statutory scheme, Congress aimed to ensure that
defendants are not tried while incompetent. The statute “provide[d] a
committing court with a strict process to which it must adhere for a

101. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174.
102. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976.
103. Marino, supra note 39, at 170 (quoting KENNETH R. FEINBERG, COMPREHENSIVE
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984: A NEW APPROACH TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 249
(Practicing Law Institute 1985)).
104. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057.
105. Kinney, supra note 57, at 692-93.
106. Id. at 693.
107. See id. at 693-94; see also sources cited supra note 59.
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competency determination to be valid.” 108 It also amended the outdated
competence standard to conform to the Supreme Court’s more recent
standard set out in Dusky v. United States. 109 The standard established by
Dusky concerns “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.” 110
The federal statutes also require that defendants receive a full range of
procedural safeguards at competency hearings. Title 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d)
provides that the defendant “shall be represented by counsel . . . . The
person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present evidence, to
subpoena witnesses on his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who appear at the hearing.” 111
Notwithstanding all of the statutory and common-law protections for
defendants in competency hearings, “defendants still face a risk of trial,
conviction, and imprisonment despite mental incompetency” due to
procedural flaws. 112 Most importantly for this Comment, the federal statute
and every circuit court to consider the issue requires the right to counsel at a
competency hearing. But this requirement is not always met, and without
direct guidance from the Supreme Court, courts of appeal have split on the
proper remedy for denial of counsel at a competency hearing.
III. The Circuit Split
Two major remedies have emerged from the courts of appeal regarding
deprivation of counsel at a competency hearing. The D.C. and Tenth
Circuits have decided the proper remedy is to order a retrospective hearing
to determine whether the violation impacted the result of the competency
hearing and thus affected the result of the trial.113 The Third and Sixth
Circuits hold differently. In these circuits, violation of a defendant’s Sixth
108. United States v. White, 887 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1989).
109. See id. at 707-08; Kinney, supra note 57, at 692-93; Stork, supra note 59, 936-37.
110. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Under the federal statute, the
standard of incompetence is defined as whether the “defendant may presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d).
112. Beaudreau, supra note 42, at 378-79.
113. United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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Amendment right to counsel at a competency hearing warrants automatic
reversal. 114
A. The Remand Approach: D.C. and Tenth Circuits
The D.C. and Tenth Circuits’ remedy for denial of counsel at a mental
competency hearing is to remand the case and order an evidentiary hearing
to retrospectively determine if the absence of counsel impacted the
competency hearing. 115 While both circuits utilize retrospective hearings,
the purpose of each circuit’s hearing is different. The D.C. Circuit utilizes
the retrospective hearing to decide whether an attorney could have made
arguments or urged decisions that could have changed the outcome of the
competency hearing. 116 This is done without any attempt to retrospectively
measure the defendant’s competency. 117 By contrast, the Tenth Circuit
instructs its trial courts to determine if the lack of counsel, in fact, resulted
in an erroneous finding of competency. 118 These trial courts must use the
trial record and any available witnesses to ascertain whether or not the
defendant was competent to stand trial.119
1. The D.C. Circuit: Could Assistance of Counsel Have Changed the
Outcome?
The D.C. Circuit set forth its remedy for denial of counsel at a
competency hearing in United States v. Klat. 120 In October 1996, Susan
Klat was indicted for threatening to assault Chief Justice Rehnquist and a
Supreme Court clerk. 121 Before her indictment, Klat filed a motion
requesting removal of her appointed attorney and asking that she be
allowed to proceed pro se. 122 Klat was later arraigned, where she again
requested removal of her appointed counsel.123 The district court denied her
motion and instead granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, which was filed
in response to Klat’s filing a civil lawsuit against him. 124 The court
114. United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d
203, 218 (3d Cir. 2001).
115. Bergman, 599 F.3d at 1148-49; Klat, 156 F.3d at 1264.
116. Klat, 156 F.3d at 1264.
117. Id.
118. Bergman, 599 F.3d at 1148.
119. Id. at 1148-49.
120. 156 F.3d at 1260.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1260-61.
123. Id. at 1261.
124. Id.
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simultaneously ordered Klat to undergo a competency evaluation due to her
bizarre behavior at the hearing, but she was not appointed new counsel.125
Klat spent approximately one month in a hospital during which a
forensic psychologist examined her mental state. 126 Despite “strong
evidence of a narcissistic personality disorder,” possible bipolar disorder,
and “excessive suspiciousness that verged on paranoia,” the psychologist
concluded Klat was competent to stand trial and submitted his findings to
the court. 127
The court held a competency hearing at which Klat appeared pro se. 128
Based on the psychologist’s report and the court’s own observation of her
behavior at the hearing, the district court concluded she was competent both
to stand trial and to represent herself. 129 However, Klat did agree to the
appointment of standby counsel who appeared with her throughout the
remainder of the trial.130
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, Klat argued the district court erred in
allowing her to appear pro se at her competency hearing. 131 The court first
noted that a competency hearing is a critical stage of trial at which a
defendant has the right to counsel.132 It then observed Klat was without
counsel from the withdrawal of her appointed attorney at the arraignment
hearing until her competency hearing when she was deemed competent
both to stand trial and waive counsel.133 The court also acknowledged the
importance of the right to self-representation. 134 But, based on Supreme
Court precedent stating that an incompetent defendant could not knowingly
and intelligently waive his right to a competency hearing, the court
reasoned it would be contradictory to argue a defendant could knowingly
and intelligently waive her right to counsel when she may be
incompetent.135 The D.C. Circuit concluded that when a defendant’s
competency is in question, “a court may not allow that defendant to waive
her right to counsel and proceed pro se until the issue of competency has

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1262.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1262.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1263 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384, 386 (1966)).
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been resolved.” 136 Consequently, Klat’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was violated when the district court ordered the competency evaluation
without reappointing her an attorney. 137
To remedy this error, the court held it was necessary to remand the case
for an evidentiary hearing to decide if counsel’s presence could have
changed the outcome of Klat’s competency hearing. 138 In making this
determination, the district court was tasked with determining what, if any,
strategic decisions or arguments counsel could have made that might have
affected the outcome. 139 These could have included the decision to retain
another expert for a second evaluation, the ability to question the expert’s
report at the competency hearing, as well as the ability for counsel to advise
the defendant on the significance of the examination and the consequences
of the evaluator’s findings. 140 Recognizing the Supreme Court’s aversion to
retrospective hearings regarding mental competency, the court expressly
stated the purpose was not to retrospectively determine “whether [Klat] was
or was not in fact incompetent to stand trial.” 141
Upon a determination that the competency hearing’s outcome would
have been the same regardless of counsel’s presence, the conviction would
stand “because the effects of the violation would be effectively confined to
the competency hearing—that is, they would not serve to contaminate the
entire criminal proceeding.” 142 On the other hand, if counsel could have
affected the result, the defendant’s conviction must be reversed because the
constitutional violation would contaminate the entire criminal
proceeding. 143
2. Tenth Circuit: Did Denial of Counsel Cause an Erroneous
Competency Determination?
Like the D.C. Circuit, the Tenth Circuit also utilizes retrospective
competency hearings to remedy the deprivation of counsel at a competency
hearing. 144 The Tenth Circuit’s hearing has a different goal, however. Here,

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1264.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2010).
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the trial court was directed to retrospectively determine if the defendant was
competent. 145
The Tenth Circuit most recently considered its remedy in United States
v. Bergman. 146 Gwen Bergman had a “long and complicated history before
[the Tenth Circuit] and the District [Court] of Colorado.” 147 Immediately
following her successful appeal of a Travel Act conviction, Bergman was
indicted on various new charges, including the use of interstate commerce
to facilitate murder for hire.148
In October 2006, Bergman’s public defender filed a motion for a
competency hearing and moved for the appointment of a special attorney to
represent her at the hearing. 149 The motions were granted and, in February
2007, Bergman was found incompetent to stand trial and ordered
hospitalized. 150
During her hospitalization, Bergman filed a pro se notice of appeal, and
while her appeal was pending, the government moved for involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication.151 Prior to the hearing on the
government’s motion, Bergman’s public defender withdrew from the case
and a new attorney entered his appearance. 152 Later, at the forced
medication hearing, the district court advised the parties of a Bureau of
Prisons report opining that Bergman was competent to stand trial.153 Yet,
the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed due to Bergman’s pending pro se
appeal. 154 Relying on counsel’s statement that she would voluntarily
dismiss her appeal due to the Bureau of Prisons report, the district court
declared Bergman competent to stand trial based solely on that report.155
After she was found competent, Bergman received a bench trial and was
convicted. 156 Following her conviction, the district court learned Bergman’s
new counsel was not a licensed attorney. 157 Thereafter, despite the court’s
own statement “that it was considering ordering a mistrial and vacating the
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1145.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1145-46.
Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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verdict,” none of Bergman’s subsequent attorneys moved for a new trial. 158
Consequently, the district court continued with Bergman’s case, ultimately
sentencing her to over one hundred months’ imprisonment. 159
On appeal of those convictions, the Tenth Circuit determined the forced
medication hearing—when Bergman was found competent—was a critical
stage of trial.160 Even though it was not a full competency hearing,
Bergman was declared competent at that hearing. 161 Furthermore, the
government did not contest its characterization as a critical stage. 162 As a
result, Bergman was entitled to counsel.163 The court subsequently adopted
a “narrow per se rule of ineffectiveness” where a defendant is unknowingly
represented by someone who has never been licensed to practice law based
on their lack of qualification. 164
The Tenth Circuit’s remedy for this violation was to remand the case for
an evidentiary hearing to decide if a retrospective competency
determination could be made. 165 The court noted that although retrospective
competency hearings are generally disfavored, they are not forbidden. 166
Four factors were laid out for the district court to consider:
(1) the passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous
medical evidence, including medical records and prior
competency determinations, (3) any statements by the defendant
in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and trial
witnesses, both experts and non-experts, who were in a position
to interact with defendant before and during trial. 167
The court instructed that trial courts should use these factors when deciding
if a retrospective determination is proper.168
The Tenth Circuit directed the trial court to use the evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the denial of counsel resulted in an erroneous
competency finding. 169 Rejecting Bergman’s request for reversal of
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1148-49.
Id. at 1148.
Id. (quoting McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962-63 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 1149.
Id.
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conviction, the court reasoned that automatic reversal is required only if the
Sixth Amendment violation pervades the entire criminal proceeding. 170 The
court determined that “[d]eprivation of the right to counsel at a competency
hearing affects the entire proceeding only if the defendant stands trial while
incompetent.” 171
Therefore, in the Tenth Circuit, if a trial court finds the defendant was
incompetent, or if a retrospective competency determination cannot be
made at all, the district court must vacate the judgment. 172 In such cases, the
court must hold a competency hearing wherein the defendant is represented
by counsel, and a new trial must proceed only when the defendant is
competent. 173 Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit also gives district courts
complete discretion to vacate the conviction and order a new trial regardless
of a determination that the defendant was competent to stand trial.174
The dissent in Bergman urged that the proper remedy was to vacate the
defendant’s conviction and order a new trial.175 Judge Holmes’
disagreement with the majority centered primarily on the fact the
government had not affirmatively asked for a retrospective competency
hearing. 176 Therefore, he was opposed to the court’s sua sponte order of this
disfavored remedy. 177 He argued against the majority’s use of the
retrospective competency hearing, which the court had “previously . . .
permitted ‘only in limited circumstances’” due to the inherent difficulty in
conducting them “in a meaningful manner.”178 Despite the dissent’s
misgivings, the Tenth Circuit has not amended its remedy since United
States v. Bergman.
B. The Automatic Reversal Approach: Third & Sixth Circuits
In contrast to the D.C. and Tenth Circuits, the Third and Sixth Circuits
have determined that because the Sixth Amendment violation contaminates
the entire criminal proceeding, the only proper remedy is automatic reversal

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1152 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the defendant’s conviction. 179 This section will explore the cases that led
to the Third and Sixth Circuits’ adoption of a rule of automatic reversal.
1. Third Circuit: Appel v. Horn
In 2001, the Third Circuit considered its remedy for deprivation of
counsel at a competency hearing in Appel v. Horn. 180 There the court
determined the proper remedy was to vacate the defendant’s conviction and
order a new trial. 181
In June 1986, Martin Appel was arrested after he and an accomplice
were charged with robbing a bank and killing three employees. 182 While
detained, he requested a public defender, and two attorneys were appointed
to represent him. 183 However, during their next day’s visit with him, Appel
told the two he had only applied for an attorney to receive visitors in prison,
and he did not want their help defending the case.184 Nonetheless, the public
defenders still appeared with Appel at a hearing the following day. 185 At the
hearing, Appel requested to proceed pro se, but before the judge would
accept his waiver, he ordered Appel to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to
determine his mental fitness. 186
A psychiatrist examined Appel and found him competent to waive
counsel after only an hour of observation. 187 Included in his report to the
court was the observation that “Mr. Appel appears to have made a rational
and well thought out decision that he would like to receive the death
penalty and would like this to occur as soon as possible.” 188 Neither of
Appel’s public defenders provided the psychiatrist with any information
regarding his competency. 189 At the competency hearing, the two reiterated
they had nothing to add when the judge deemed Appel competent and
accepted his waiver of counsel.190 The two public defenders were, however,

179. United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d
203, 218 (3d Cir. 2001).
180. 250 F.3d at 217-18.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 205.
183. Id. at 206.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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appointed as standby counsel. 191 Appel ultimately pled guilty to his crimes
and was sentenced to death. 192 Then, nearly nine years later, after his death
warrant was signed and his execution date set, Appel requested counsel and
began his appeal, arguing he had been mentally ill and incompetent during
the initial proceedings. 193
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the court determined Appel’s competency
hearing was a critical stage of trial at which he was entitled to assistance of
counsel. 194 Appel’s public defenders were counsel of record from the time
of their appointment until waiver of counsel was accepted, and this included
Appel’s competency hearing. 195 Although the two were technically Appel’s
counsel, the court found no evidence to the contrary that they utterly failed
to “subject the crucial competency determination in this capital case to any
adversarial testing.” 196 Other than one conversation with Appel’s parents, 197
they made no effort to look into Appel’s health or employment records or
investigate his background in order to assist in determining their client’s
competency. 198 Finding that Appel’s attorneys failed to meet the
“meaningful adversarial testing” standard from United States v. Cronic, the
court held Appel was constructively denied counsel when the district court
found him competent to waive counsel.199
In determining the proper remedy, the Third Circuit rejected the
government’s argument for a retrospective competency hearing, citing
Supreme Court and prior circuit case law as disapproving of such a
remedy. 200 Instead, the court found the Sixth Amendment violation
contaminated the entire proceeding and, therefore, rendered it unfair. 201
Explaining that the Supreme Court had “consistently held that there should
be a new trial if there has been some constitutional defect regarding the

191. Id.
192. Id. at 207.
193. Id. at 207-08.
194. Id. at 215.
195. Id. at 213.
196. Id. at 216 (citing Brief of Appellee at 8-9, Appel, 250 F.3d 203 (2001) (No. 999003)).
197. Id. at 215. “[T]hese conversations concerned paying bills and handling property, not
Appel’s competency.” Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 217.
200. Id. (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d
159 (3d Cir. 1998)).
201. Id. at 218.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss2/2

2015]

COMMENT

309

defendant’s competency,” 202 the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that the proper remedy was to vacate the defendant’s conviction and
order a new trial. 203
Accordingly, courts in the Third Circuit will automatically vacate a
defendant’s conviction and grant him a new trial upon finding he was
deprived of representation at a competency hearing. This result follows the
Third Circuit’s holding that this Sixth Amendment violation contaminates
the entire proceeding. 204
2. Sixth Circuit: United States v. Ross
The Sixth Circuit joined the Third Circuit in holding that deprivation of
counsel at a competency hearing warrants automatic reversal in United
States v. Ross. 205 In October 2007, Bryan Ross was indicted as the
ringleader in a multidefendant counterfeit-check scheme in which the
defendants used bogus checks to purchase and quickly resell vehicles. 206
Prior to trial, Ross’s bizarre and paranoid behavior caused three courtappointed attorneys to withdraw from his case. 207 While represented by his
third attorney, Ross filed a motion to waive counsel.208 Three days later, the
government filed for a competency evaluation and hearing. 209 The court
denied both parties’ motions. 210 A week following denial of his first
motion, Ross again requested substitute counsel and was again denied. 211
Instead, the court found Ross competent both to waive counsel and to
represent himself, and it appointed his current counsel as standby. 212 The
court subsequently granted the government’s second motion for a
competency evaluation and hearing. 213 However, Ross was never
reappointed full-time counsel prior to his competency hearing, at which he

202. Id. at 217-18 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975); Pate, 383 U.S. at
386-87; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960)).
203. Id. at 218.
204. Id.
205. 703 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 2012).
206. Id. at 865.
207. Id. For example, Ross’ first attorney alleged Ross exhibited “paranoid ideations,”
was in a “delusional state,” and thought there were “conspiracy theories” against him such
that the attorney and the prosecutor were “in cahoots.” Id. at 867.
208. Id. at 865.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 865-66.
212. Id. at 866.
213. Id.
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was deemed fit to stand trial.214 Ross was ultimately convicted of
conspiracy and several other charges. 215
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held the district court did not err in granting
Ross’s initial waiver of counsel, but it did err in failing to reappoint fulltime counsel once the government’s motion for a competency hearing was
granted. 216 The court determined Ross should not have been allowed to
proceed pro se at his competency hearing based on mandatory federal
statutory language requiring that “‘the person whose mental condition is the
subject of the hearing shall be represented by counsel.’” 217
Along with the statutory violation, the Sixth Circuit held “Ross’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated when the court allowed him to
proceed without counsel despite having questions about his
competency.” 218 Although Ross was initially deemed competent to
represent himself when the court accepted his waiver of counsel, questions
about his competency arose later when the court granted the government’s
motion for a competency examination and hearing. 219 Courts are under a
continuing duty to be aware of circumstances suggesting a defendant’s
incompetence. 220 In this case, the court found reasonable cause to believe
Ross was incompetent to stand trial when it ordered the competency
examination.221 Because the level of competency required to stand trial is
lower than that to represent oneself, the district court violated the Sixth
Amendment when it did not provide counsel for Ross’s competency
hearing. 222
In determining the proper remedy for this violation, the court first
decided a competency hearing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. 223
Based on that determination and referencing prior circuit case law, the court
stated, “‘[i]t is settled that a complete absence of counsel at a critical stage
of a criminal proceeding is a per se Sixth Amendment violation warranting
reversal of a conviction, a sentence, or both, as applicable, without analysis
for prejudice or harmless error.’” 224 In a previous case, the Sixth Circuit had
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 868 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d)).
Id. at 869.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. White, 887 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Id.
Id. at 869-71.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 873-74 (quoting Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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engaged in an extensive analysis of Supreme Court and other circuit court
decisions that it interpreted as requiring this result. 225 Noting the current
circuit split on the remedy, the court found “no reason to create an
exception to our established rule” of automatic reversal for such Sixth
Amendment violations. 226
Because Ross had standby counsel at his competency hearing, the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case and instructed the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether standby counsel provided
adequate representation or if Ross was unconstitutionally deprived of
representation at his competency hearing. 227 The court’s remedy was
decided based on the Supreme Court’s “meaningful adversarial testing”
standard from Cronic. 228 Therefore, on remand, if the trial court found
standby counsel did not provide meaningful adversarial testing at Ross’s
competency hearing, his conviction and sentence should be vacated.229 If
standby counsel did provide adequate representation, however, “Ross was
not unconstitutionally deprived of counsel and his conviction is
affirmed.” 230 Accordingly, in the Sixth Circuit, courts will automatically
reverse a criminal defendant’s conviction upon complete or constructive
denial of counsel at a critical stage of trial.
C. The State Split: How State Supreme Courts are Confronting Competency
State courts have also split on the appropriate remedy for deprivation of
counsel at a competency hearing. The crux of the states’ disagreement
mirrors the federal split: whether the Sixth Amendment deprivation of
counsel violation pervades the entire criminal proceeding.
The California Supreme Court considered the issue in 2012 in People v.
Lightsey. 231 There the court held that although the absence of counsel was
225. See Van, 475 F.3d at 311-12.
226. Ross, 703 F.3d at 874.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 279 P.3d 1072 (Cal. 2012). It appears that the Supreme Court of California is the
only state Supreme Court to affirmatively order a retrospective hearing to remedy a Sixth
Amendment violation in a competency hearing. See id. at 1097. However, the vast majority
of other states including Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma and Texas regularly order
retrospective competency hearings to remedy other constitutional violations in the
competency hearing context. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 130 P.3d 69, 78-79 (Kan. 2006)
(acknowledging retrospective hearings are generally allowed, but not permitted in the instant
case due to the lack of medical evidence in the record); State v. Bostwick, 1999 MT 237, ¶
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structural error typically requiring automatic reversal, “[i]n limited
situations . . . where the denial of counsel was for a discrete time or hearing
only . . . the rule of automatic reversal is inappropriate.” 232 Citing the
United States Supreme Court in Satterwhite v. Texas, the court reasoned the
trial court could effectively judge whether the violation affected the
outcome of the trial or whether the error was harmless. 233 Because the
violation was committed outside the jury’s presence, the trial court could
retrospectively review the case to decide if the violation was harmless
beyond reasonable doubt. 234 Therefore, instead of a rule of automatic
reversal, the court ordered limited reversal to “determine whether a
retrospective competency hearing is feasible.”235 If such a hearing is
possible, the court found it “both appropriate and permissible” to engage in
retrospective analysis.236
By contrast, although it did not decide the issue, the Supreme Court of
Washington noted that a competency hearing is a critical stage of trial. 237
Citing United States v. Cronic, the court stated that “[a] complete denial of
counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings is presumptively prejudicial
and calls for automatic reversal.”238
IV. Why The Third and Sixth Circuit’s Rule of Automatic Reversal is the
Only Acceptable Remedy for Denial of Counsel at a Mental Competency
Hearing
The Third and Sixth Circuits’ rule of automatic reversal is the only
remedy that adequately protects a criminal defendant’s fundamental Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at a competency hearing. This section will
31, 296 Mont. 149, 161, 988 P.2d 765, 772 (remanding “to determine if a meaningful
retrospective competency hearing can be held”); Tate v. State, 1995 OK CR 24, ¶ 6, 896
P.2d 1182, 1186 (stating retrospective competency hearings do not violate due process); Ex
parte Lawton, Nos. WR-65068-01, WR-65068-02, 2006 WL 3692632, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. Dec. 13, 2006) (remanding for a determination of whether a retrospective competency
hearing is feasible).
232. Lightsey, 279 P.3d at 1097.
233. Id. (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988)).
234. Id. at 1098 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991)).
235. Id. at 1102.
236. Id.
237. See State v. Heddrick, 215 P.3d 201, 207-08 (Wash. 2009) (holding that although
the court affirms “the Court of Appeals on the issue of due process during competency
proceedings,” the defendant “was not denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage in
the proceedings”).
238. Id. at 207 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984)).
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discuss the advantages of the Third and Sixth Circuits’ remedy and examine
the flaws behind the D.C. and Tenth Circuits’ remedy.
A. A Third and Sixth Circuit Analysis
The Third and Sixth Circuits concluded the proper remedy for
deprivation of counsel at a competency hearing was automatic reversal of
the defendant’s conviction. 239 Both circuits arrived at this remedy by
applying language from Cronic. 240
The Supreme Court’s holding in Cronic that the denial of counsel at a
critical stage of trial renders the trial unfair seemingly makes the remedial
decision an easy one. The rationale behind the case reveals the Supreme
Court’s opinion regarding the fundamental nature of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Denial of that fundamental right at a critical
stage is so likely to affect the defendant’s trial that prejudice is not required
to establish a violation. 241
By adopting the Cronic analysis and rejecting retrospective competency
hearings, the Third and Sixth Circuits effectively—and correctly—rejected
harmless error review as the proper remedy. 242 Retrospective review for
harmless error is inappropriate because, in order to amount to reversible
error, the harmless error rule requires proof that the constitutional violation
prejudiced the defendant’s trial and “‘might have contributed to the
conviction.’” 243 To meet Cronic, courts acknowledge the constitutional
violation was so egregious that the defendant is not required to make any
showing of prejudice. 244 Because the defendant was not required to show
prejudice to establish the Sixth Amendment violation, a requirement of
prejudice for reversal seemingly places the value of a new trial above a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
Simply ensuring the trial’s outcome was fair through harmless error
analysis does not adequately protect a criminal defendant’s fundamental
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court has reasoned, “It is
true enough that the purpose of [the Sixth Amendment] is to ensure a fair
trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the
239. United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d
203, 218 (3d Cir. 2001).
240. Ross, 703 F.3d at 874; Appel, 250 F.3d at 212-13.
241. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984).
242. See, e.g., Ross, 703 F.3d at 873-74.
243. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
244. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59.
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trial is, on the whole, fair.” 245 Depriving a defendant of counsel at a
competency hearing affects the entire structure of the criminal proceeding.
As the United States Supreme Court has consistently held, the only
acceptable remedy for these violations is reversal and retrial.246
B. Cronic Contamination: Depriving a Defendant of Counsel at His
Competency Hearing Infects the Entire Trial
As the above cases illustrate, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel can be violated in several different ways. A defendant may be
completely deprived of counsel by being permitted to proceed pro se at his
own competency hearing, 247 or he may be constructively denied counsel
due to his attorney’s failure to provide “meaningful adversarial testing” at
the hearing. 248 Regardless of the circumstances underlying the
constitutional violation, once the court fails to provide the defendant
adequate competency procedures, the only adequate remedy is reversal and
retrial. 249
Depriving a defendant of his right to counsel at a competency hearing is
not an error that remains confined to the hearing. This structural error
undermines “the fairness of the trial process” and “pervade[s] the entire
proceeding.” 250 Defendants who are ordered into competency proceedings
are in an extremely vulnerable state. Competency hearings are only ordered
when a defendant’s behavior has provided the court reasonable belief that
he is mentally unstable to the point that he may “presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 251
In addition to their mental vulnerability, defendants may enter into
competency proceedings defensively in light of the court’s inquiry into their

245. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006).
246. Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 181-82 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1966); Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960)).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
248. See, e.g., Appel, 250 F.3d at 216-17; Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding Cronic standard met where the defendant’s attorney slept through the
proceeding).
249. Beaudreau, supra note 42, at 386.
250. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss2/2

2015]

COMMENT

315

mental competency. 252 Whether the court orders the hearing sua sponte or it
is requested by one of the parties, 253 this creates the potential for a tense
atmosphere and can lead to a lack of cooperation during the competency
proceedings. An uncooperative defendant is unlikely to provide helpful
information to an examining psychologist. Without such information, and
in the absence of counsel, the defendant has no way to effectively challenge
the psychologist’s findings or the court’s decision when he is actually or
constructively deprived of the assistance of counsel. And, as the Supreme
Court has made “abundantly clear,” the stakes involved at competency
hearings render the need for counsel exceptionally high both “for the
defendant [and] the integrity of our judicial proceedings.” 254
Contamination of a defendant’s trial is most likely to occur upon a
determination that an incompetent defendant is, in fact, competent. Once a
defendant is deemed competent, the trial proceeds as normal. 255 In the case
of a pro se defendant, this individual will continue to represent himself,
proceeding with all aspects of pre-trial and trial representation until he
hires, or is appointed, counsel. 256 Although the dangers of selfrepresentation are not present in constructive denial of counsel cases, these
situations still pose serious constitutional hazards.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “prohibits the trial of
an incompetent defendant.” 257 Failing to provide adequate procedural and
substantive protections to safeguard a defendant’s right not to stand trial
while incompetent is an express violation of a defendant’s right to due
process. 258 Whether the defense attorney utterly failed to provide actual
assistance of counsel or the defendant was allowed to represent himself in
the competency hearing, an incompetent defendant could easily slip through
the cracks and be allowed to stand trial. The Supreme Court has explicitly
prohibited this result. 259 Moreover, “[e]nsuring the defendant’s competence
252. E.g., People v. Lightsey, 54 Cal. 4th 668, 683, 279 P.3d 1072, 1086 (2012) (“In
response to the court's order [for a psychiatric assessment and competency hearing],
defendant questioned how the court could ‘suspend criminal proceeding[s] without giving
[him] an opportunity to speak,’ and stated, ‘Cancel the doctor's appointment. I don't need a
doctor. I refuse.’”).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
254. Parsons, supra note 16, at 243-44.
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
256. See generally People v. Robinson, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
257. Marino, supra note 39, at 166.
258. Beaudreau, supra note 42, at 376.
259. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162
(1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)).
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preserves not only the accuracy but also the fairness, dignity and honor of
the verdict, all of which form the cornerstone of the American judicial
system.” 260
Equally as significant are the implications surrounding a finding of
incompetence. Upon such a finding, the defendant faces the possibility of
involuntary hospitalization for an indeterminate period of time and even the
risk of forced medication. 261 Subjecting a defendant to involuntary
commitment after depriving him of the means to effectively raise a defense
in the proceedings leading to his commitment is an extreme violation of due
process.
The competency doctrine is designed “to guarantee reliability in criminal
prosecutions, to ensure that only those defendants who can appreciate
punishment are subject to it, and to maintain moral dignity, both actual and
apparent, in criminal proceedings.” 262 None of these goals are met when a
defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during his
competency hearing. Depriving a defendant of his right to counsel risks
sending him through to trial while incompetent. This contaminates the
entire proceeding and warrants automatic reversal of the defendant’s
conviction. 263
C. The D.C. and Tenth Circuits’ Remedies Do Not Adequately Protect a
Defendant’s Fundamental Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel at a
Competency Hearing
The D.C. and Tenth Circuits both based their remedial decisions on the
Supreme Court’s language in Satterwhite. 264 Effectively adopting
Satterwhite’s rule of harmless error, both courts remanded for retrospective
hearings to determine if the deprivation of counsel contaminated the entire

“It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Id.
260. Marino, supra note 39, at 167.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2012); WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 46, § 208.
262. J. Amy Dillard, Madness Alone Punishes the Madman: The Search for Moral
Dignity in the Court's Competency Doctrine as Applied in Capital Cases, 79 TENN. L. REV.
461, 461 (2012).
263. E.g., Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 218 (2001).
264. United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding “a Sixth Amendment
violation requires automatic reversal only when the constitutional violation pervades the
entire criminal proceeding” (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1998))));
United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1263-64 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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proceeding. 265 Each court provided a different objective for their
retrospective hearing, 266 and each has its own fatal flaws.
1. The Supreme Court Has Since Implicitly Rejected the D.C. Circuit’s
Remedy
The objective of the D.C. Circuit’s remedy is to retrospectively
determine whether counsel could have changed the outcome of the
competency hearing. 267 The D.C. Circuit instructed the trial court to base its
judgment on whether counsel could have made certain arguments or
decisions to change the result of the hearing. 268 This remedy may seem
ideal because it squarely addresses the issue of the effect of denial of
counsel on the competency hearing. However, a more recent Supreme
Court case illustrates the practical difficulties of such a determination and
renders the D.C. Circuit’s chosen remedy inappropriate.
The 2006 Supreme Court case United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez suggests
the Court would disapprove of the D.C. Circuit’s particular type of
retrospective determination. 269 Because the Sixth Amendment provides that
a defendant has the right to hire counsel of his choosing, the Court held
Gonzalez-Lopez’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when
the district court denied his choice of counsel.270 Because “[t]he right to
select counsel of one’s choice” is “regarded as the root meaning of the
constitutional guarantee” of the Sixth Amendment, the Court found the
violation without any analysis for prejudice. 271
To remedy this violation, the Court first explained the two relevant types
of constitutional errors. 272 Most constitutional errors are trial errors, which
occur while the case is being presented to the jury. 273 These can be
qualitatively assessed to determine whether or not they were harmless. 274
Other errors, such as the denial of counsel, are structural in that they affect
the entire framework of the trial and, therefore, “‘defy analysis by
‘harmless-error’ standards.’” 275
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Bergman, 599 F.3d at 1148-49; Klat, 156 F.3d at 1263-64.
Bergman, 599 F.3d at 1148-49; Klat, 156 F.3d at 1263-64.
Klat, 156 F.3d at 1264.
Id.
See 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 309-10 (1991)).
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The Court had “little trouble concluding” that denial of GonzalezLopez’s right to his choice of counsel was a structural defect, which
“‘affec[ted] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ and [was] not
‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’” 276 Denial of counsel was
structural error because of the countless alternate arguments and strategies a
different attorney could have employed. 277 Because “[i]t [would be]
impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have
made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the
outcome of the proceedings,” the Court would not allow “speculative
inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.”278
The D.C. Circuit’s remedy for denial of counsel at a competency hearing
is inappropriate because it purports “to determine whether counsel might
have made certain decisions or arguments which could have changed the
result of the competency hearing.” 279 Although retrospective review of a
competency hearing would be more limited than review of a trial, this is
nevertheless the “speculative inquiry” into “an alternate universe” that the
Supreme Court rejected in Gonzalez-Lopez. 280
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Retrospective Competency Hearing Remedy is
Disfavored by the Supreme Court
The unpopularity of retrospective competency hearings is well
documented. 281 Moreover, it has been suggested that “[a]ny attempt to
retrospectively determine competency violates the [defendant’s] procedural
due process right[s].” 282 But although the Tenth Circuit recognized the
Supreme Court’s disfavor with retrospective competency hearings, it still
chose to proceed with this remedy in United States v. Bergman.283 In
ordering the retrospective hearing, the court aimed to determine if the lack
of counsel led to an erroneous conclusion that the defendant was competent
to stand trial. 284 This remedy was based on the court’s conclusion that
“[d]eprivation of the right to counsel at a competency hearing affects the
entire proceeding only if the defendant stands trial while incompetent.” 285
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 148, 150 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10).
Id. at 150.
Id.
See United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.
E.g., Pate v. Robinson 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966).
See Beaudreau, supra note 42, at 373.
599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id.
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Therefore, on remand, the district court must determine if it was possible,
based on the record, to decide whether the defendant had been competent to
stand trial on the date of the original competency hearing. 286 However,
“[a]lthough the circuit courts have created procedures for retrospectively
determining competency, ‘[r]eason exists to believe the United States
Supreme Court would not approve the procedure[s].’” 287
Although the Supreme Court has mentioned the possibility of
retrospective competency hearings, it has also emphasized the inherent
difficulty in making such judgments. 288 Retrospective competency
determinations are made solely from the record, which is less reliable than a
contemporaneous hearing. 289 The retrospective hearing may be held several
years after the original determination, when the court cannot “observe the
subject of [its] inquiry, and expert witnesses would have to testify solely
from information contained in the printed record.” 290 In one case, the
Supreme Court explained that doubts and ambiguities in the record
developed more than a year prior would make a retrospective competency
determination too difficult, so instead a new trial was ordered.291 In fact,
the Supreme Court has never ordered a retrospective competency
hearing. 292
The Tenth Circuit attempted to alleviate the Supreme Court’s concerns
by crafting a test that considered the amount of time that had passed since
the competency hearing and the quality and quantity of evidence available
from which a judgment could be made. 293 Recognizing the inherent
difficulty in such a determination, however, the Tenth Circuit ultimately
gave the district court total discretion to grant a new trial even upon finding
the defendant was competent to stand trial. 294 Otherwise, if the district court
found the defendant was competent to stand trial, the conviction would
stand. 295 However, if the defendant was found incompetent, the district
court was ordered to vacate the judgment, hold a competency hearing where

286. Id. at 1149.
287. Beaudreau, supra note 42, at 373 (quoting People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 330 (Cal.
2011) (Werdegar, J., concurring)).
288. E.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966).
289. See Beaudreau, supra note 42, at 373.
290. Pate, 383 U.S. at 387.
291. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960).
292. See Beaudreau, supra note 42, at 373.
293. United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010).
294. Id. at 1149.
295. Id.
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the defendant would be represented by counsel, and ultimately proceed with
a new trial. 296
The Tenth Circuit’s decision is somewhat confusing. It is difficult to
understand why the court would go to the trouble of justifying adoption of
the disfavored retrospective competency hearing remedy and then give the
district court complete discretion to vacate and order a new trial, regardless
of the outcome of the prescribed test. The court undoubtedly understands
the difficulty in conducting meaningful retrospective hearings, and its grant
of ultimate discretion almost encourages new trials. 297 Nevertheless, the
Tenth Circuit still clings to its prior circuit decisions.
3. Why Are Courts Ordering a Disfavored Remedy?
Trials are expensive. Retrospective competency hearings may be thought
to prevent the waste of taxpayer dollars and may also help alleviate the
burdened judicial system by providing a limited review instead of an
entirely new trial. However, in choosing this option, courts are merely
trading the financial costs of a new trial for the costs of faith in the
“fairness, dignity and honor of the verdict” which comprise the foundation
of our criminal justice system. 298
Certainly, a rule of “[a]utomatic reversal is strong medicine that should
be reserved for constitutional errors that ‘always’ or ‘necessarily[]’ . . .
produce such unfairness.” 299 However, the denial of a defendant’s
fundamental Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage of a
criminal proceeding warrants this remedy. “[L]awyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries,” 300 and their absence from a competency hearing
can negatively impact the remainder of the criminal trial. A bright-line rule
of automatic reversal hovering over a trial judge’s head will encourage
close attention and ensure that defendants whose mental status is in
question will not have to face a competency hearing alone.
V. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has continually expressed concerns
about a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel and has an established
history of protecting incompetent defendants. Based on its implicit rejection
296. Id.
297. See id. at 1148-49.
298. Marino, supra note 39, at 167.
299. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 159 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
300. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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of the D.C. Circuit’s remedy and its long-standing disapproval of
retrospective competency hearings, it is likely the only remedy the Supreme
Court would allow for denial of counsel at a competency hearing is the
Third and Sixth Circuits’ rule of automatic reversal. Violating a defendant’s
right to counsel at his competency hearing is structural error that infects the
entire trial and renders it unfair. The only solution that effectively remedies
this violation and adequately protects a criminal defendant’s fundamental
Sixth Amendment right of representation is the Third and Sixth Circuits’
rule of automatic reversal of conviction.
Jenny Fehring
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